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Abstract – In recent years, there has been growing interest in studying evolutionary games
with environmental feedback. Previous studies exclusively focus on two-player games. How-
ever, extension to multi-player game is needed to study problems such as microbial cooperation
and crowdsourcing collaborations. Here, we study coevolutionary public goods games where
strategies coevolve with the multiplication factors of group cooperation. Asymmetry can arise
in such environmental feedback, where games organized by focal cooperators may have a dif-
ferent efficiency than the ones by defectors. Our analysis shows that coevolutionary dynamics
with asymmetrical environmental feedback can yield oscillatory convergence to persistent co-
operation, if the relative changing speed of cooperators’ multiplication factor is above a certain
threshold. Our work provides useful insights into sustaining group cooperation in a changing
world.
Introduction. – Cooperation is a prominent phe-
nomenon that widely exists in natural systems among
various scales, ranging from microbes to human societies
[1–4]. Evolutionary game theory is a powerful theoreti-
cal approach to study and understand why and on what
conditions a persistent cooperation situation would occur
[5–11]. In particular, public goods game (PGG) provides
valuable insight into group cooperation [12–15], consid-
ering the great challenges we face nowadays, like global
(a)E-mail: Xin.Wang-2@dartmouth.edu
(b)E-mail: feng.fu@dartmouth.edu
warming, pollution control and overexploitation of natu-
ral sources [16,17].
PGG can be seen as an extension of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma [18,19]. In the classical PGG model with well-
mixed interactions, the population eventually evolves
into a mutual defection state where cooperation vanishes,
under the assumption that individuals always choose ra-
tional strategies based on the incentives [20]. A great
amount of works concentrate on solving this well-known
tragedy of the commons [21, 22] by taking into account
different realistic factors and evolving mechanisms in the
game, such as kin selection [23], punishment and reward
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[24, 25], direct and indirect reciprocity theories [26–30],
and in particular spatial reciprocity [31–34]. Addition-
ally, a variety of factors describing heterogeneity of play-
ers have been incorporated, such as optional participa-
tion mechanism [35], network topology structure [36,37],
wealth-based selection [38] and different environment of
the population [39]. These studies proved that hetero-
geneity plays an important role in promoting group co-
operation in the real world [40,41].
Recently, a new framework of replicator dynamics with
feedback-evolving games has been proposed to charac-
terize the phenomenon that environment and individ-
ual behavior coevolves in many social-ecological and
psychological-economic systems [35, 42–48]. The envi-
ronmental feedback can result in oscillating dynamics
of both environment quality and strategy states [49].
The persistent cycles also occur in asymmetric condi-
tions with a heterogeneous environment [39]. A more
general framework for eco-evolutionary games shows that
the cyclic dynamics only occurs under the condition that
the environmental change is slow enough compared to
strategy dynamics [50]. These models provide deep in-
sights into the cooperation behavior in coevolutionary
systems [51].
With the rapid development of network technology,
crowdsourcing project, which is a new form of online
collaboration aiming to complete a project by solicit-
ing contributions from a large group of people or online
communities, has attracted increasing attention in re-
cent years [52]. Crowdsourcing has been successfully ap-
plied into many fields, such as knowledge discovery and
management, crisis mapping, and crowdfunding [53–55].
Interestingly, these online cooperations often happen un-
der the preliminary conditions that there exists an au-
thoritative organizer who leads the game and may de-
cide the global payoff distributions to some extent, which
is an important new character. In most crowdsourcing
cases, cooperations are encouraged through a higher pay-
off structure for cooperators, such as extra incentives in
commercial project or preferential access in knowledge
discovery, which causes the emergence of asymmetrical
feedback. We then raise an important question: on what
conditions will these collaborations form successfully in
general sense? Specifically, from the perspective of col-
laboration organizers, how to change the synergy effect
of group of cooperators to encourage cooperation when
the total resource and benefit of the project is restrained?
In this paper, we focus on the scenario where the mul-
tiplication factor of cooperators rc coevolves with the
strategies in PGG (Similarly we also consider coevolving
rd for defectors, see details in Appendix B). We would
like to see how ratios of total payoffs of cooperators vs
defectors affect evolving adaptive environment. We let
the multiplication factor of cooperators, rc, changes in
response to the global payoff difference between cooper-
ators and defectors in the system, and in turn the mul-
tiplication factor, rc, affects the evolutionary dynamics
of individual cooperation behaviors. In this way, we add
in the role of authoritative organizers who aim to orga-
nize the collaboration and can enforce the global pay-
off distributions, as described above. We highlight the
conclusion that the feedback-evolving evolution can give
rise to oscillating convergence to persistent cooperation
in some parameter regime, but only if the relative chang-
ing speed of cooperators’ multiplication factor exceeds a
threshold. This result indicates that this asymmetrical
environmental feedback in PGG is effective for group co-
operation only when the feedback updates quickly and
promptly enough compared to the strategy change. Our
work sheds light on how to successfully organize a group
collaboration and avoid the traps of social dilemma in
projects like crowdsourcing.
Model. – We consider PGG in a well-mixed in-
finitely large population, with each individual choosing
to be a cooperator or defector, who contributes to the
public pool or not, respectively. In each game, one fo-
cal individual randomly chooses other s players to play
the game, which means there are in total s + 1 partic-
ipants in one game. In classical PGG, the total contri-
bution is multiplied by a multiplication factor r and dis-
tributes to every participant equally. Here to character-
ize the asymmetrical environmental feedback, we assume
defector’s multiplication factor rd keeps constant, which
is relatively low, and cooperator’s multiplication factor
rc keeps changing depending on the influence of global
payoff distribution. In turn, the changing rc affects in-
dividual’s payoff and drives dynamics of strategies, as
illustrated in fig. 1.
We denote x as the frequency of cooperators in the
population. For simplicity and without loss of generality,
we let the contribution of each cooperator be 1. For a
focal individual, the possibility that m out of s selected
p-2
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Fig. 1: Schematic of the asymmetrical environmental feed-
back mechanism of our model. Graph on the top shows how
the population evolves according to replicator dynamics, and
meanwhile, total payoff of cooperators and defectors gives
feedback to cooperator’s multiplication factor and in turn
modifies the dynamics of strategies.
individuals are cooperators is(
s
m
)
xm(1− x)s−m (1)
Thus expectation of the focal individual’s payoff is
Pc =
s∑
m=0
(
s
m
)
xm(1− x)s−m
[
(m+ 1)rc
s+ 1
− 1
]
= −1 + (1 + sx)
s+ 1
rc
(2)
Pd =
s∑
m=0
(
s
m
)
xm(1− x)s−m mrd
s+ 1
=
sx
s+ 1
rd
(3)
Replicator dynamics are widely used in evolutionary
games, which describes the time evolution of the fre-
quency of each strategy. Here the replicator equation
for x, the frequency of cooperators in the population, is
x˙ = x(Pc − P¯ )
= x(1− x)
(
sx+ 1
s+ 1
rc − sx
s+ 1
rd − 1
)
(4)
where P¯ denotes the average payoff of the population.
The other equation describing dynamics of coopera-
tor’s multiplication factor is
r˙c = (rc − α)(β − rc)f(x, rc) (5)
where f(x, rc) describes the feedback mechanism of total
payoff in game interaction with its sign deciding whether
rc increases or decreases. α and β denote minimum and
maximum values of multiplication factor of cooperators,
therefore by the term (rc−α)(β− rc), rc will grow logis-
tically and be confined to the range [α, β]. According to
social dilemma of PGG, we have 1 < α < β < s + 1. 
denotes the relative changing speed of rc compared to x.
The multiplication factor of cooperators, which is charac-
terized by rc, in turn influences the payoffs as well as the
frequencies of different strategies, resulting in a feedback
loop. We assume the multiplication factor of cooperators
is modified by global payoffs due to the limitation of total
rewards for the project and the zero-sum characteristic
of resource consumption:
f(x, rc) = −xPc + θ(1− x)Pd (6)
where xPc and (1−x)Pd are the global payoff for cooper-
ator and defector in the population, respectively. θ > 0
denotes the ratio of increasement rate to decreasment
rate of cooperator’s and defector’s total payoff expecta-
tion in the system. Here, when resource is adequate, co-
operators are rewarded according to their contributions
to the public pool, while depletion of resources in the
crowdsourcing prevent cooperator’s multiplication factor
increasing infinitely.
Thus the ODE systems for our model can be written
as:
x˙ = x(1− x)
(
sx+ 1
s+ 1
rc − sx
s+ 1
rd − 1
)
r˙c = (rc − α)(β − rc)
[
−x
(
−1 + rc(1 + sx)
s+ 1
)
+θ(1− x) rdsx
s+ 1
]
(7)
Results. – Stability of fixed points and thresholds of
multiplication factors
There are six possible fixed points of the model: five
are on the boundary and the remaining one is an in-
terior fixed point. For the five boundary fixed points,
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only two of them can be stable: (i) (x∗ = 0), the pop-
ulation is dominated by defectors and is always stable,
which also occurs in the classic model of PGG; and (ii)
(x∗ = 1, rc = α), which is stable only if the multiplica-
tion factor of defectors, rd, is smaller than the threshold
r∗d =
(s+1)(α−1)
s . This possible fixed point corresponds
to the state where the population is dominated by coop-
erators and the multiplication factor of cooperators rc is
at its minimum value.
Fig. 2: Impact of varying model parameters on population
equilibrium states. Panel (a) and (b) show changes of the
interior fixed point (x∗ and r∗c ) as θ increases, with rd = 0.5
for (a) and rd = 1.5 for (b). (c) presents the critical boundary
of rd as well as the threshold r
∗
d as θ increases. (d) shows the
dependence of the threshold of relative changing speed ∗ on
θ and rd. In all panels, s = 3, α = 1.5, β = 3.5.
Besides, there is one interior fixed point which can be
stable: 
x∗ =
θ
1 + θ
r∗c =
θrds+ (s+ 1)(θ + 1)
θs+ θ + 1
(8)
It corresponds to a stable population composed by both
cooperators and defectors, with a medium value of coop-
erators’ multiplication factor. Eq. 8 indicates that the
final position of interior fixed point is only influenced by
θ, the ratio of increasement rate to decreasement rate
of cooperators and defectors global payoff, which char-
acterizes the nature of the project itself. The detailed
impacts of θ on x∗ and r∗c are shown in fig. 2(a)(b). We
fix s = 3, α = 1.5, β = 3.5 and we have r∗d =
2
3 . There-
fore we set rd = 0.5 for fig. 2(a) and rd = 1.5 for fig.
2(b), respectively. Results show that when θ increases,
the stable frequency of cooperators x∗ increases, while
the cooperator’s multiplication factor r∗c decreases. In
order to get an intuitive understanding, we raise an ex-
ample of a team work. If the team work does not require
strong abilities of the workers, like pure labour work, θ
increases accordingly, calling for more people participat-
ing in the team work for better outcome. Eventually,
there will be a higher proportion of cooperators with a
relatively low multiplication factor of cooperators. On
the contrary, if team members are expected to be more
skilled, like in scientific collaborations, the decrease of θ
asks for people who can make real contributions to the
project, resulting in lower frequency of cooperators with
higher multiplication factor of cooperators.
Since α ≤ rc ≤ β, the interior fixed point is meaningful
only when
max{α(θs+ θ + 1)− (s+ 1)(θ + 1)
θs
, 0} ≤ rd
≤ β(θs+ θ + 1)− (s+ 1)(θ + 1)
θs
(9)
In fig. 2(c), we show critical boundary of rd as well as
the position of threshold r∗d as θ increases.
Finally, this interior fixed point is stable only when
 > ∗, in which ∗ depends on other parameters s, rd, θ, α
and β, which writes
∗ =
(1− x∗)s(r∗c − rd)
(sx∗ + 1)(r∗c − α)(β − r∗c )
(10)
The interior fixed point is the center of limit cycle ( =
∗) or is unstable ( < ∗) otherwise. In fig. 2(d), we
set s = 3, α = 1.5, β = 3.5 and show how ∗ varies as
θ and rd change. We choose three values for θ: 0.5, 1
and 1.5, in which condition 0 ≤ rd ≤ 3, 0 ≤ rd ≤ 196
and 19 ≤ rd ≤ 299 , respectively. ∗ firstly goes down
sharply followed by mild decreases and a steep increase,
causing by the logistic term (rc−α)(β − rc). In realistic
games we concern more about the situations where the
multiplication factor of defectors is neither too large nor
too small and ∗ does not change much. Besides, ∗ is
larger when θ is smaller.
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The detailed proof for the stability of all six fixed
points using Jacobian matrices is shown in Appendix A.
Detailed conditions for the emergence of persistent co-
operation
In fig. 3, we show how asymmetrical environmental
feedback mechanism affects system state under different
situations using phase graphs. We choose a group of
parameters s = 3, α = 1.5, β = 3.5, θ = 2 and we have
r∗d =
2
3 accordingly. Therefore we set rd = 0.5, 1.5 for two
rows separately, where the thresholds of  are 1411 and
2
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correspondingly, according to Eq. 10. Fig. 3(a)-(c) show
that a mutual cooperation state can always occur as long
as rd < r
∗
d, which means when defector’s multiplication
factor is much lower than cooperator’s, the asymmet-
rical environmental feedback mechanism can effectively
promote the emergence of group collaboration. However,
this condition can rarely be satisfied in real world, espe-
cially in PGG where one can hardly control defector’s
payoffs. Therefore, we concern more about the emer-
gence of persistent co-existence of cooperators and defec-
tors, i.e., the stability condition of interior fixed point.
The comparison of fig. 3(a) vs (b)(c) as well as (e) vs
(f)(g) reveals that the relative changing speed of coop-
erator’s multiplication factor  determines the stability
of interior fixed point. The persistent co-existence of co-
operators and defectors can only emerge when  exceeds
a threshold ∗. In particular,  > ∗ is the only chance
for breaking social dilemma when rd > r
∗
d, as shown in
fig. 3(e)-(g). Therefore, we conclude that the asym-
metrical environmental feedback in PGG is effective for
the emergence of group cooperation only when the feed-
back updates quickly enough compared to the strategy
dynamics.
Furthermore, in fig. 4, we present time evolutions of
different system states, representing by the frequency of
strategies and the multiplication factor of cooperators,
corresponding to the situations shown in fig. 3(a)-(c).
Parameters are s = 3, α = 1.5, β = 3.5, θ = 2, rd = 0.5
and  = 1.5, 1411 , 1 for fig. 4(a)-(c) respectively. Here
rd < r
∗
d. In fig. 4(a),  > 
∗, which means the asym-
metrical environmental feedback is quickly and promptly
enough, the interior fixed point is stable. A popula-
tion with initial conditions near the interior fixed point
experiences oscillating convergence to the interior equi-
librium state. Other initial states far from the interior
fixed point experience rapid oscillation and converge to
the boundary, either cooperation-dominated or defector-
dominated. In fig. 4(b), when  < ∗, which indicates
the cooperators are not rewarded in time and all initial
states oscillate to the boundary. In fig. 4(c), interior
fixed point becomes center of the limit cycle when  is
exactly at its threshold, in which situation a tiny range of
initial state of the system experiences regular and contin-
uous oscillation around the center. Initial point from the
rest part of the domain ends either in defector-dominated
or in cooperator-dominated population.
Conclusion. – In this paper, we extend the two-
player evolutionary games with environmental feedback
to multi-player situation where strategies coevolve with
the multiplication factor of group cooperation. Using
coevolutionary PGG framework, we study a new form
of collaboration in real world. To describe the existence
of asymmetry in the games where focal organizers who
aim to organize the collaboration may enforce the global
payoff distributions, we differentiate the multiplication
factor of cooperators and defectors. On one hand, co-
operators are encouraged in order to avoid the social
dilemma by increasing their multiplication factor. While
on the other hand, resource will limit the number of co-
operators when their global payoff is large enough. By
adding this asymmetrical environmental feedback mech-
anism to replicator dynamics, the population can oscilla-
torily converge to a cooperator-defector coexisting state
if the relative changing speed of cooperator’s multipli-
cation factor exceeds a threshold, breaking tragedy of
the commons in traditional PGG. The final frequency of
cooperators is determined only by one parameter: the
ratio of increasement rate to decreasement rate of coop-
erator’s and defector’s global payoff, involving with the
limitation of total resource and the zero-sum character-
istic of resource consumption. If the ratio is relatively
large, which means cooperation in the project is not that
resource-consuming, it appears to be more cooperators in
the population and they get a relatively low multiplica-
tion factor. Conversely, there are fewer cooperators who
get higher multiplication factor if the ratio is small, cor-
responding to projects which are resource-consuming.
This asymmetrical environmental feedback mechanism
well describes collaboration situations like crowdsourcing
projects, which has potential applications to explain a
number of real-world cooperation phenomena. Our work
p-5
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Fig. 3: Phase plane dynamics of x− rc system with s = 3, α = 1.5, β = 3.5, θ = 2. For the first row, rd = 0.5,  = 1.5, 1411 , 1.
For the second row, rd = 1.5,  = 0.4,
2
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, 0.2. Graphs in the last column are magnification of the area near interior fixed
points, highlighted with red rectangles in the third column. Blue, yellow and grey areas show attracting fields of different
fixed points (x∗ = 0), (x∗ = 1, r∗c = α) and (x
∗ = θ
θ+1
, r∗c =
θrds+(s+1)(θ+1)
θs+θ+1
), respectively.
Fig. 4: Time evolutions of the system state, representing
by the frequency of strategies and the multiplication fac-
tor of cooperators, under different initial conditions. Pa-
rameters are s = 3, α = 1.5, β = 3.5, θ = 2, rd = 0.5 and
 = 1.5, 14
11
, 1 for (a)-(c), respectively. Initial conditions are
shown in each graph. Inserted small graphs in the third
column are magnification of the dynamics of initial point
x0 = 0.6666, rc0 = 1.6666.
also shows detailed conditions for the emergence of sta-
ble cooperation with resource restraints, thereby shed-
ding light on organizing a successful group collaboration
under similar circumstances. While current results focus
on linear PGG, a potential direction for further stud-
ies is extending our framework to nonlinear PGG, such
as threshold PGG which has been successfully used to
better understand human behaviors in response to the
climate change [56–58].
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Appendix A: Stability of fixed points in asymmetrical environmental feedback model. – Differential equations
describing the whole system are
x˙ = x(1− x)
(
sx+ 1
s+ 1
rc − sx
s+ 1
rd − 1
)
r˙c = (rc − α)(β − rc)
[
−x
(
−1 + rc(1 + sx)
s+ 1
)
+ θ(1− x) rdsx
s+ 1
] (1)
Jacobian of this system is(1− 2x)( sx+1s+1 rc − sxs+1 rd − 1)+ x(1− x) s(rc−rd)s+1 x(1− x) sx+1s+1
(rc − α)(β − rc)
[
1− rc(1+2sx)
s+1
+ θ
rds(1−2x)
s+1
]
x
[
(α+ β − 2rc)
(
1− rc(1+sx)
s+1
+ θ(1− x) rds
s+1
)
− (rc − α)(β − rc) (1+sx)s+1
]
Letting the derivatives of x and rc to be 0 and considering the preconditions, we can find several fixed points of this system.
(1) x∗ = 0
J(x∗ = 0) =
[
rc
s+1 − 1 0
(rc − α)(β − rc)
(
1− rcs+1 + θ rdss+1
)
0
]
Eigenvalues are λ1 =
rc−(s+1)
s+1 < 0 (since rc ≤ β < s+ 1) and λ2 = 0. Therefore the fixed point is stable.
(2) x∗ = 1, r∗c = α
J(1, α) =
[ rds
s+1 − α+ 1 0
0 (β − α)(1− α)
]
Eigenvalues are λ1 =
rds
s+1 − α+ 1 and λ2 = (β − α)(1− α) < 0. This fixed point is stable when
rd <
(s+ 1)(α− 1)
s
(2)
(3) x∗ = 1, r∗c = β
J(1, β) =
[ rds
s+1 − β + 1 0
0 (α− β)(1− β)
]
Eigenvalues are λ1 =
rds
s+1 − β + 1 and λ2 = (β − α)(β − 1) > 0. This fixed point is unstable.
(4) x∗ = s+1−αs(α−rd) , r
∗
c = α
J(x∗, α) =
[
x∗(1− x∗) s(α−rd)s+1 x∗(1− x∗) sx
∗+1
s+1
0 (β − α)x∗
[
1− α(1+sx∗)s+1 + θ(1− x∗) rdss+1
]]
Eigenvalues are λ1 = x
∗(1 − x∗) s(α−rd)s+1 and λ2 = (β − α)x∗
[
1− α(1+sx∗)s+1 + θ(1− x∗) rdss+1
]
. When λ1 < 0, α < rd, so
λ2 = (β−α) θθ+1 1s+1
[
(s+ 1− α) + sθθ+1 (rd − α)
]
> 0. Therefore the two eigenvalues cannot be negative simultaneously and the
fixed point is unstable.
(5) x∗ = s+1−βs(β−rd) , r
∗
c = β
J(x∗, α) =
[
x∗(1− x∗) s(β−rd)s+1 x∗(1− x∗) sx
∗+1
s+1
0 (α− β)x∗
[
1− β(1+sx∗)s+1 + θ(1− x∗) rdss+1
]]
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Eigenvalues are λ1 = x
∗(1− x∗) s(β−rd)s+1 > 0 and λ2 = (α− β)x∗
[
1− β(1+sx∗)s+1 + θ(1− x∗) rdss+1
]
. This fixed point is unstable.
(6) Interior fixed point 
x∗ =
θ
1 + θ
r∗c =
θrds+ (s+ 1)(θ + 1)
θs+ θ + 1
(3)
J(x∗, r∗c ) =
[
x∗(1− x∗) s(r∗c−rd)s+1 x∗(1− x∗) sx
∗+1
s+1
(r∗c − α)(β − r∗c )
[
1− r∗c (1+2sx∗)s+1 + θ rds(1−2x
∗)
s+1
]
−x∗(r∗c − α)(β − r∗c ) sx
∗+1
s+1
]
If we use [
A B
C D
]
to represent the complicated matrix mentioned above. There are two conditions for the interior fixed point to be stable:{
AD −BC > 0
A+D < 0
(4)
The first condition is always satisfied. Therefore, the interior fixed point is stable when
 > ∗ (5)
where
∗ =
(1− x∗)s(r∗c − rd)
(sx∗ + 1)(r∗c − α)(β − r∗c )
(6)
To sum up, fixed point on the boundary x∗ = 0 is always stable. Another fixed point on the boundary x∗ = 1, r∗c = α is
stable when rd <
(s+1)(α−1)
s . Interior fixed point x
∗ = θθ+1 , r
∗
c =
θrds+(s+1)(θ+1)
θs+θ+1 is stable when  >
(1−x∗)s(r∗c−rd)
(sx∗+1)(r∗c−α)(β−r∗c ) .
Appendix B: Population, cooperator’s multiplication factor, and defector’s multiplication factor coevolving
model. – In the main text, the multiplication factor of defectors is fixed. Here we discuss a more general model with coevolution
of strategy dynamics and multiplication factor of both cooperators and defectors. Similar to the cooperators multiplication factor
feedback model we have analyzed that cooperation behavior is encouraged when the proportion of cooperators is low while the
amount of cooperators is limited due to the limitation of resources, the full model can be described using differential equations
as: 
x˙ = x(1− x)(Pc − Pd) = F (x, rc, rd)
r˙c = 1(rc − α)(β − rc) [−xPc + θ(1− x)Pd] = G(x, rc, rd)
r˙d = 2(rd − γ)(η − rd) [−θ(1− x)Pd + xPc] = H(x, rc, rd)
(7)
where α (γ) and β (η) denote the minimum and maximum values of multiplication factor of cooperators (defectors). 1 and 2
denote relative changing speed of rc and rd compared to the ratio of cooperators in population. Input the forms of Pc and Pd,
equations turn 
x˙ = x(1− x)
(
sx+ 1
s+ 1
rc − sx
s+ 1
rd − 1
)
r˙c = 1(rc − α)(β − rc)
[
θ(1− x) sxrd
s+ 1
− x
(
sx+ 1
s+ 1
rc − 1
)]
r˙d = 2(rd − γ)(η − rd)
[
x
(
sx+ 1
s+ 1
rc − 1
)
− θ(1− x) sxrd
s+ 1
] (8)
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Therefore we have Jacobian for the system
J =

∂F
∂x
∂F
∂rc
∂F
∂rd
∂G
∂x
∂G
∂rc
∂G
∂rd
∂H
∂x
∂H
∂rc
∂H
∂rd

where
∂F
∂x
= (1− 2x)
(
sx+ 1
s+ 1
rc − sx
s+ 1
rd − 1
)
+ x(1− x)s(rc − rd)
s+ 1
∂F
∂rc
= x(1− x)sx+ 1
s+ 1
∂F
∂rd
= −x(1− x) sx
s+ 1
∂G
∂x
= 1(rc − α)(β − rc)
[
1− 1 + 2sx
s+ 1
rc + θ
(1− 2x)s
s+ 1
rd
]
∂G
∂rc
= 1x
[
(α+ β − 2rc)
(
1− rc(1 + sx)
s+ 1
+ θ(1− x) rds
s+ 1
)
− (rc − α)(β − rc) (1 + sx)
s+ 1
]
∂G
∂rd
= 1(rc − α)(β − rc)θ(1− x) sx
s+ 1
∂H
∂x
= 2(rd − γ)(η − rd)
[
2sx+ 1
s+ 1
rc − 1− θ (1− 2x)s
s+ 1
rd
]
∂H
∂rc
= 2(rd − γ)(η − rd)xsx+ 1
s+ 1
∂H
∂rd
= 2(γ + η − 2rd)
[
x
(
sx+ 1
s+ 1
rc − 1
)
− θ(1− x) sx
s+ 1
rd
]
+ 2(rd − γ)(η − rd)
[
−θ(1− x) sx
s+ 1
]
(9)
Letting derivatives of x, rc and rd to be 0, here are the conditions for fixed points.
(1) x∗ = 0
J(x∗ = 0) =

r∗c
s+1 − 1 0 0
1(r
∗
c − α)(β − r∗c )
(
1− αs+1 + θ r
∗
ds
s+1
)
0 0
2(r
∗
d − γ)(η − r∗d)
(
α
s+1 − 1− θ r
∗
ds
s+1
)
0 0

Three eigenvalues are λ1 =
r∗c−(s+1)
s+1 < 0 (since r
∗
c ≤ β < s+ 1) and λ2 = λ3 = 0. Therefore the fixed point is stable.
(2) x∗ = 1, r∗c = α, r
∗
d = γ
J(1, α, γ) =
 sγs+1 + 1− α 0 00 1(β − α)(1− α) 0
0 0 2(η − γ)(α− 1)

Three eigenvalues are λ1 =
sγ
s+1 +1−α, λ2 = 1(β−α)(1−α), and λ3 = 2(η−γ)(α−1) > 0 (since 1 < α < β < s+1, γ < η).
Therefore the fixed point is unstable.
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(3) x∗ = 1, r∗c = α, r
∗
d = η
J(1, α, η) =
 sηs+1 + 1− α 0 00 1(β − α)(1− α) 0
0 0 2(γ − η)(α− 1)

Eigenvalues are λ1 =
sη
s+1 + 1− α, λ2 = 1(β − α)(1− α) < 0, and λ3 = 2(γ − η)(α− 1) < 0. The fixed point is stable when
η < η∗, with
η∗ =
(s+ 1)(α− 1)
s
(10)
(4) x∗ = 1, r∗c = β, r
∗
d = γ/η
Three eigenvalues are λ1 =
r∗ds
s+1 + 1−β, λ2 = 1(α−β)(1−α) > 0 (since 1 < α < β < s+ 1), and λ3 = 2(γ+η−2r∗d)(β−1).
Therefore the fixed points are unstable.
(5) r∗c = α/β, r
∗
d = γ/η, x
∗ = s+1−r
∗
c
s(r∗c−r∗d)
If x∗ exists, r∗c > r
∗
d always exists. One of the eigenvalue is λ1 = x
∗(1− x∗) s(r∗c−r∗d)
s+1
> 0. Therefore the fixed points are unstable.
(6) Interior fixed point 
x∗ = θ
θ+1
α ≤ r∗c ≤ β
θsγ+(θ+1)(s+1)
θs+θ+1
≤ r∗c ≤ θsη+(θ+1)(s+1)θs+θ+1
r∗d =
(θs+θ+1)r∗c−(θ+1)(s+1)
θs
(11)
is stable when (
∂F
∂x
+
∂G
∂rc
+
∂H
∂rd
) ∣∣∣∣
x=x∗,rc=r∗c ,rd=r∗d
< 0 (12)
that is
(θ + 1)(s+ 1)− (θ + 1)r∗c
θ
< 1(r
∗
c − α)(β − r∗c )(θs+ θ + 1) + 2(r∗d − γ)(η − r∗d)θs (13)
In order to have a more explicit understanding of the system, we choose parameters s = 3, α = 1.5, β = 3.5, γ = 0.5, η = 1.5, θ = 2.
The stable condition for interior fixed point turns
4− r∗c < 61(r∗c − 1.5)(3.5− r∗c ) + 92
(
r∗c − 5
3
)(
7
3
− r∗c
)
(14)
and the value of r∗c has a range of
[
5
3
, 7
3
]
. Population dynamics are demonstrated in fig. 1 with different 1, 2 and initial conditions chosen.
For the first row in fig. 1, 1 = 2 = 0.5 and the stable condition for interior fixed point (eq. 13) turns 30r
∗
c
2 − 136r∗c + 149 < 0, which
is satisfied when r∗c >
34
15
−
√
154
30
≈ 1.853. Therefore the interior fixed point is stable for most rc values here. At this situation, the speed
of feedback from payoff is fast enough. System initialized from some parameter regimes experiences oscillation and finally evolves to the
state with stable frequency of both cooperators and defectors. Here the final frequency of cooperators is only determined by parameter θ,
which is influenced by the games themselves. Lager θ is, lower ratio of cooperators will emerge in the population. Meanwhile, the stable
multiplication factors of cooperators and defectors satisfy the following conditions and depend on specific initial conditions
r∗d =
3r∗c − 4
2
(15)
System initialized from other conditions ends in defector dominated state.
While for the second row in fig. 1, 1 = 2 = 0.1 and the stable condition for interior fixed point (eq. 13) turns 30r
∗
c
2−152r∗c + 213 < 0,
which is never satisfied. So the interior fixed point is unstable any time and the relative changing speed of multiplication factors of
cooperators and defectors compared to population dynamics is not large enough. System initialized from conditions except the interior
fixed point ends in state without cooperators, corresponding to results from classical PGG.
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Fig. 1: Evolutionary dynamics in population, cooperator’s multiplication factor and defector’s multiplication factor coevolving games with
different initial conditions converging to corresponding fixed points. Parameters are s = 3, α = 1.5, β = 3.5, γ = 0.5, η = 1.5, θ = 2. For
the first row: 1 = 2 = 0.5; for the second row: 1 = 2 = 0.1. Different initial conditions are shown each graph.
In conclusion, here we observe similar phenomena to the coevolutionary model shown in the main text where the multiplication factor
of defectors is fixed. The stable cooperating population emerges only if the relative feedback speed of multiplication factor is fast enough
compared to evolution dynamics. And the final proportion of cooperators is only determined by θ, which is affected by the intrinsic game
properties.
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